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Updates from the International Criminal Courts
International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
Cases and Proceedings
The trial of influential Serbian nationalist and politician Vojislav Šešelj restarted
on December 7, 2007. Šešelj has been
awaiting trial at The Hague for five years
after voluntarily surrendering to the
Tribunal. His trial was halted last year in
response to a 28-day hunger strike he conducted in protest over various evidentiary
matters, including his wish to have the
book he authored translated into English
so as to be submitted into evidence. Šešelj
is the leader of the nationalist Serbian
Radical Party (SDS), which holds one third
of the seats in Serbia’s Parliament. He also
formed and led a notoriously violent militia group associated with the SDS, popularly known as the Chetniks or Šešelj’s
Men. He has been indicted for inciting
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Prosecutors claim that by using inflammatory rhetoric and propaganda, he rallied
his several-thousand-men-strong militia
into committing atrocities against civilians
in Croatia and Bosnia. Observers expect
Šešelj’s behavior at trial to be similar to
predecessor defendant Slobodan Milošević,
who frequently shouted obscenities and
created chaos in the courtroom. The first
day of Šešelj’s trial proved as dramatic
as expected with the accused defending
nationalist views and taking credit for the
idea and movement behind the creation of
a “Greater Serbia.”
One of the men responsible for the
lengthy and brutal siege of Sarajevo,
Dragomir Milošević, was found guilty on
December 12, 2007 for committing crimes
against humanity and violations of the
laws or customs of war. He was sentenced
to 33 years’ imprisonment. A Bosnian
Serb, General Milošević commanded the
Bosnian Serb Army’s Sarajevo Romanija
Corps in August 1994. He oversaw the terror campaign against the besieged city for
15 months. Under his order the city was
shelled relentlessly and its residents subject to sniper fire. One of the more horrific

mortar attacks that briefly captured the
world’s attention was the shelling of the
Markele Market by the Romanija Corps in
August of 1995. Many Bosnian Serbs have
maintained that the Bosnian Army shelled
its own people to stir up international sympathy; however, the Tribunal struck down
this theory previously. The bench was
particularly disturbed by the use, under
Milošević  ’s command, of modified air
bombs to attack densely-packed Sarajevo
because these bombs are “highly inaccurate weapon[s]” with “extremely high
explosive force.” One expert witness stated
that the bombs could deviate from their
intended target by up to a kilometer.
The Appeals Chamber rejected the
appeal of Dragan Zelenovic´ on October 31,
2007 and affirmed his 15-year sentence for
the torture and rape of Bosnian Muslim
women and girls from Foča    in eastern
Bosnia. Zelenovic´,   a Bosnian Serb soldier
and de facto military policeman, assisted
in the capture of about 70 Muslim civilians
— women, children, and elderly — from
Fo č a     after the Bosnian Serb Army overtook the municipality in June of 1992. The
group was held for several months in deteriorating circumstances, subject to starvation and assault. Zelenović raped several
women, repeatedly, throughout the duration of their captivity. He was indicted with
several other members of the Bosnian Serb
military police and paramilitary groups in
April of 1992 after being on the run from
the Tribunal for several years. He pled
guilty to torture and rape as a crime against
humanity.
Rape has long been considered a crime
that could amount to a crime against
humanity. The ICTY has recognized that
sexual violence may be a tool used against
civilians during war. The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has also
recognized this, finding rape as an act
of genocide in the first case before that
Tribunal. Before the recent ICTY conviction of the men involved in widespread
rape of women in Foč  a  , however, international tribunals did not prosecute rape as a
crime against humanity.
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To constitute a crime against humanity,
the crime of rape must be committed as a
part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population. This element is what distinguishes crimes against
humanity from ordinary crimes. The targeting of a collective group, in the form
of a civilian population, rather than the
individual victim, places crimes against
humanity among the gravest of crimes. Of
the five other individuals indicted withZelenović, the Tribunal convicted three
— Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač,     
and Zoran Vuković — for raping, torturing, and enslaving a number of Bosnian
Muslim women and girls. The prosecution of the rapes committed against the
women of Fo č a led to the first convictions
by the ICTY for not only rape but also for
enslavement as crimes against humanity.
The remaining two defendants on
the Foča    indictment, Gojko Janković and
Radovan Stanković, were transferred to
Bosnia and Herzegovina to stand trial
before Sarajevo’s War Crimes Chamber.
Janković was found guilty of torture and
rape and sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment. Stanković was convicted of enslavement and rape and sentenced to 20 years’
imprisonment. Stanković escaped custody
in May 2007 and has yet to be apprehended.
The acquittal of Sefer Halilović, the
former Deputy Commander and Chief of
Main Staff of the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was affirmed
by the Appeals Chamber on October 16,
2007. The Prosecution appealed the Trial
Chamber’s 2005 judgment that Halilović
was not responsible under a theory of
command responsibility for atrocities committed by Bosnian troops in the villages of
Grabovica and Uzdol in Herzegovina in
September 1993. The Appeals Chamber
affirmed the acquittal stating that the
Prosecution had failed to establish that
Halilović exercised the required degree of
effective control over the troops to establish superior responsibility.
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Contempt of Court Charges
Two more witnesses scheduled to testify
for the Prosecution in the Haradinaj et al.
case were indicted for contempt of court in
November 2007. The two witnesses, Avni
Krasniqi and Sadri Selca, were supposed
to testify for the Prosecution and were
subpoenaed, but despite assurances of witness protection, the two witnesses refused.
The Prosecution felt that the witnesses
had been intimidated, believing there have
been problems with witness intimidation
throughout the trial. Haradinaj, a popular,
well-known former Prime Minister and
member of the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA), is charged with participation in a
joint criminal enterprise aimed at obtaining full control over a partially KLAcontrolled region through forcible removal
and mistreatment of Serbians and Kosovar
Albanians believed not to support KLA
goals. The difficulty the Prosecution has
faced in convincing witnesses to testify has
led it to seek witness subpoenas and other
measures for witness protection.

A Farewell to Former
Prosecutor Del Ponte
On January 1, 2008, the appointment
of the ICTY’s new Prosecutor Serge
Brammertz came into effect. Brammertz
is the fifth Prosecutor to take office at the
Tribunal, following Ramon Escovar Salom,
Richard Goldstone, Louise Arbor, and
Carla Del Ponte. Brammertz comes to the
ICTY from his position as Commissioner of
the International Independent Investigation
Commission into the assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik
al-Hariri.
Carla Del Ponte leaves her eightyear tenure at the Tribunal for a position
as Swiss Ambassador to Argentina. In
Del Ponte’s final address to the Security
Council regarding the progress of the
Tribunal, she warned of meddling from
Serbia. She accused the Serbian government of blocking the arrest of the two
most wanted leaders of the political and
military branches of the former Bosnian
Serb Government, Radovan Karadžić and
Ratko Mladić, respectively. Del Ponte
claimed that Serbian officials refused to
conduct “even the most basic investigatory procedures” and that the two men had

been “repeatedly sighted” in Serbia. She
said that despite rhetorical commitment to
capture and hand over the four remaining
fugitives, Serbia has “no clear roadmap,
no clear plan in the search for fugitives,
no serious leads, and no sign that serious
efforts have been taken to arrest the fugitives.” Del Ponte recognized that Serbia
has made efforts to cooperate with the
Tribunal, such as establishing a National
Security Council to serve as a link between
the Tribunal and the government, but that
these steps are “slow and inefficient.” She
alleges that Serbia negotiated with Ratko
Mladić regarding his transfer to The Hague
as recently as 2006, but that Serbia refused
to arrest and transfer him involuntarily.
Del Ponte repeated her oft-stated warning to the European Union (EU) not to
consider Serbia as a candidate for accession until Karadžić and Mladić are apprehended. Unfortunately, the European
Union appears to be moving forward with
the process regardless of whether Serbia
complies with the Tribunal’s demands.
After pro-western Boris Tadić ’s reelection
as President of Serbia in February 2008,
the EU Enlargement Commissioner hinted
that he was ready to sign a Stabilisation and
Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia,
a precursor to accession. The Belgians and
Dutch are sticking to Del Ponte’s message,
however, insisting that no SAA be signed
until Serbia hands over the remaining
defendants.
Just days before his trip to Brussels
to meet with the EU Enlargement
Commissioner and foreign policy chief,
the new Chief Prosecutor issued a statement heralding the capture of the four
remaining fugitives as the “absolute priority” of the Tribunal. While Del Ponte was
renowned for her public criticism of Serbia,
Brammertz is known for subtle diplomacy and quiet work behind the scenes.
Hopefully, Serbia will respond positively
to Brammertz’s style of persuasion, and
the outstanding indictees will stand trial at
the Tribunal.
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International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda
Mikaeli Muhimana v.
The Prosecutor, Case No.
ICTR-95-1B-A
On May 21, 2007, the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment in the
case Mikaeli Muhimana v. the Prosecutor.
The Accused had appealed from an April
28, 2005 conviction for genocide and the
crimes against humanity of rape and murder, for which he had received multiple
life sentences. A majority of the Appeals
Chamber reversed the factual findings of
the Trial Chamber regarding two acts of
rape and one act of murder, but affirmed
the sentences of life imprisonment for each
of Muhimana’s convictions.
Among the grounds of appeal submitted by Muhimana against his April 2005
conviction was the claim that the Trial
Chamber erred in law and in fact by finding
that he had the intent to commit genocide,
when it was established at trial that, inter
alia, he had a Tutsi wife whom he protected through the end of the war and that
he had saved other individual Tutsis. The
Appeals Chamber unanimously rejected
this claim, noting that the Trial Chamber
made a number of findings in support
of its conclusion that the Appellant participated in killing and seriously injuring
Tutsi victims with the intention to commit
genocide, and stating that “evidence of
limited and selective assistance towards a
few individuals does not preclude a trier of
fact from reasonably finding the requisite
intent to commit genocide.”
Muhimana also raised several claims of
legal and factual errors based on the Trial
Chamber’s assessment of different witnesses. Nearly all of these claims were dismissed on the grounds that the Appellant
failed to demonstrate either “that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached
the finding” based on the challenged testimony, or that “the error occasioned a miscarriage of justice.” However, a majority
of the Appeals Chamber did agree with
Muhimana that the Trial Chamber erred in
fact when convicting the Appellant for two
rapes based on the testimony of someone
who was not an eyewitness to the alleged
crimes. While the Appeals Chamber noted
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that it is permissible to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence, and that
the witness did provide sufficient evidence to establish that two victims were
raped inside the Appellant’s home, the
testimony was insufficient to establish
that it was the Appellant, as opposed to
another perpetrator, that committed the
crimes. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber
reversed the factual findings relating to
these two rapes. Nonetheless, it modified
neither the Appellant’s conviction for rape
as a crime against humanity, nor the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber for
that crime, as the conviction was based
on a finding that Appellant had committed 12 acts of rape, only two of which
were reversed. Judges Shahabuddeen and
Schomburg dissented, arguing that it was
the Trial Chamber, and not the Appeals
Chamber, that was in the best position to
determine whether the facts sufficiently
established Muhimana’s role in the alleged
crimes.
The Appellant was also successful in
his claim that the Trial Chamber erred
in finding that he had killed a particular
individual, namely a pregnant woman, in
mid-May 1994 on Rugona Hill, because
the indictment failed to give the Appellant
proper notice of the time and place of
the alleged crime and his alleged role
in it. The Appeals Chamber found that
the indictment was in fact defective and
that, contrary to the findings of the Trial
Chamber, the defect had not been cured
through information included in a Pre-Trial
Brief. The Appeals Chamber recognized
that, under some circumstances, a defective indictment may be cured by information such as a summary of anticipated
testimony submitted in a Pre-Trial Brief,
but in this case, the information provided
in the brief did not “simply add greater
detail in a consistent manner with a more
general allegation already pleaded in the
Indictment, [but] … modifie[d] the time,
location, and physical perpetrator, matters
that were already specifically pleaded in
the Indictment, albeit in a materially different manner.” As a result, a majority of the
Appeals Chamber invalidated Muhimana’s
conviction on one count of murder as a
crime against humanity. Once again, however, the Appeals Chamber found that the
error neither invalidated the Appellant’s
conviction for murder as a crime against
humanity — as the conviction was based

on several murders — nor the sentence of
life imprisonment for the conviction. Judge
Schomburg dissented from the majority,
finding that the defect in the indictment
had been cured because the information
contained in the Pre-Trial Brief informed
the Appellant clearly, consistently, and in
a sufficient manner about the crime for
which he was charged, as well as the place
and time at which the crime occurred.
Finally, the Appellant claimed that the
Trial Chamber erred in sentencing him
to life imprisonment on the grounds that
the Chamber failed to consider mitigating
circumstances in violation of Article 23
of the ICTR Statute. Muhimana argued
that several factors should have mitigated
his sentence, including the fact that he
had no prior criminal convictions; he was
only 33 years old during the relevant
period; he is the father of nine children;
that he protected several Tutsis during the
events of 1994; and that he occupied a low
position in the Rwandan administrative
structure at the time of his crimes. The
Appeals Chamber rejected the Appellant’s
claims, explaining that: (i) the record did
not show that Muhimana offered substantiating evidence in support of his alleged
mitigating factors prior to sentencing; (ii)
although the Trial Chamber is required to
consider mitigating circumstances, it is
under no obligation to actually mitigate a
sentence based on the factors offered; and
(iii) even when mitigating circumstances
exist, a Trial Chamber can impose a life
imprisonment sentence when the gravity
of the crimes so requires. The Appeals
Chamber noted that the Appellant made
no allegations challenging the gravity of
his crimes.

Aloys Simba v. The Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR-01-76-A
The Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) affirmed the Trial Chamber’s conviction of Aloys Simba on November 27,
2007. A retired lieutenant colonel and
member of the “Comrades of the fifth
of July,” the group responsible for the
coup d’état that brought former President
Juvenal Habyarimana to power in 1973,
Simba was also a member of parliament
from 1989 to 1993. The Trial Chamber
found the Appellant guilty of genocide and
extermination as a crime against humanity
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based on his participation in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) to kill Tutsi civilians
at Murambi Technical School and Kaduha
Parish. He was sentenced to 25 years in
prison for his crimes. Simba challenged
the Trial Chamber’s judgment and his sentence based on fourteen separate grounds
of appeal, all of which were dismissed
by the Appeals Chamber. The Prosecutor
also challenged Simba’s sentence, saying that a single sentence of 25 years was
insufficient. Again, the Appeals Chamber
dismissed this ground of appeal.
Among the grounds of appeal raised by
Simba was the claim that he was denied
a fair trial because two witnesses refused
to appear before the Tribunal to testify in
his defense. According to Simba, these
witnesses, referred to as BJK1 and HBK,
were prevented from testifying due to the
“interference” of Rwandan government
officials. The Appeals Chamber stated that
it could conceive of situations where a fair
trial would not be possible because “witnesses crucial to the Defense case refuse to
testify due to State interference.” However,
to establish such a claim, it is incumbent
on the Defense to demonstrate that such
interference in fact took place, and that
the Defense “exhausted all available measures to secure the taking of the witnesses’
testimony.” In Simba’s case, the Appeals
Chamber first found that the Appellant had
not fulfilled his burden of establishing that
Witness BJK1’s refusal to testify was a
result of government interference. By contrast, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the
Trial Chamber that there was evidence that
the government interfered with Witness
HBK’s testimony. However, the Appeals
Chamber also agreed with the lower court
that the witness’s testimony would likely
have been of limited probative value.
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber found
that the Defense had failed to exhaust all
available measures to secure the taking of
the witness’s testimony. Hence, Appellant’s
challenges based on the unavailability of
witnesses in his defense were dismissed.
The Appellant also raised several challenges to his conviction for genocide and
extermination as a crime against humanity
pursuant to a JCE. Among these challenges was a claim that an accused cannot
be held responsible under a JCE theory of
liability unless the accused participated in
the planning of the JCE itself. Specifically,
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Appellant pointed to the fact that the
Trial Chamber held that he was criminally
liable for crimes committed at Murambi
Technical School and Kaduha Parish,
despite finding that the evidence failed
to establish that the Appellant was either
the “architect” of the attacks or that he
“played a role in their planning.” However,
the Appeals Chamber determined that it is
“well-established that it is not necessary
for a participant to have participated in the
planning of a JCE in order to be convicted
for participation in it.” Simba also claimed
that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that
he “shared the common purpose of killing
Tutsi” in Murambi and Kaduha merely
as a result of his presence and conduct in
those areas. The Appeals Chamber rejected
this argument, stating inter alia that Simba
was found not only to have been present
at the two massacre sites, but also to have
distributed weapons and encouragement to
the assailants, and thus it was reasonable
to conclude that the Appellant shared the
intent to carry out the common purpose of
killing Tutsi at Murambi Technical School
and Kaduha Parish.
Finally, the Appellant raised a number of challenges to his conviction for
genocide with respect to the massacres at
Murambi and Kaduha Parish. For example, he argued that the Trial Chamber
erred by not requiring the Prosecution to
prove the existence of a plan or policy
as a fundamental element of the crime of
genocide. The Appeals Chamber easily
dismissed this challenge, noting that under
the jurisprudence of both the ICTR and
the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, the existence of
an agreement or a plan is not an element
required for a conviction of genocide.
The Appeals Chamber also rejected the
Appellant’s claim that the specific intent to
commit genocide must be formed prior to
the commission of genocidal acts, holding
that the Trial Chamber correctly held that
it is the existence of the intent to commit
genocide at the moment the acts are committed that matters.

Special Court for Sierra Leone
Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana
and Allieu Kondewa, Case No.
SCSL-04-14-T
On August 2, 2007, the Trial Chamber
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone
(SCSL) delivered its judgment in the case
of Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and
Allieu Kondewa. The case, which was the
second case to conclude at the SCSL trial
level, involved the conviction of two top
members of Sierra Leone’s Civil Defense
Forces (CDF), a paramilitary organization that fought in support of the elected
Sierra Leonean government during the
country’s civil war. Each was convicted by
a majority of the Trial Chamber of either
committing or bearing superior responsibility for the following acts in violation
of Article 3 Common to the Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and of Additional
Protocol II to those Conventions: murder,
cruel treatment, pillage and issuing collective punishments. In addition, Kondewa
was convicted on one count of “other serious violations of international humanitarian law” in the form of conscripting child
soldiers. Both men were unanimously
acquitted of the crimes against humanity of
murder and other inhumane acts, as well as
the war crime of terrorism. Justice Bankole
Thompson partially dissented from the
judgment, writing a separate opinion in
which he would have acquitted Fofana and
Kondewa on all counts based, inter alia,
on findings that their acts were dictated
by necessity and thus were legally defensible. Justice Thompson also concluded
that the Accused benefited from a defense
referred to as salus civis suprema lex est,
which means “the safety of the state is the
supreme law.”
Initially, the CDF trial involved three
accused: Sam Hinga Norman, who was
the National Coordinator of the CDF;
Fofana, the National Director of War; and
Kondewa, who was High Priest of the
CDF. However, Norman died in surgery in
February 2007, while the trial was ongoing, and the Trial Chamber terminated his
proceedings three months later. According
to the indictments against Norman, Fofana,
and Kondewa, each was responsible for
eight counts of crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and other inhumane acts. The
Prosecutor charged that each Accused bore
criminal responsibility because, inter alia,
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the alleged crimes were committed as part
of a joint criminal enterprise (JCE), or were
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
that enterprise. The common “plan, purpose or design” of the CDF, according
to the Prosecutor, was to “use any means
necessary to defeat the RUF/AFRC forces
and to gain and exercise control over
the territory of Sierra Leone.” Notably,
Trial Chamber II of the SCSL, which
presided over the trial against the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC),
had refused to consider JCE as a theory
of criminal liability in that case on the
grounds that the common plan described
in the AFRC indictment — namely, to gain
and exercise political power and control
over the territory of Sierra Leone — was
“not inherently criminal.”
Fofana raised a similar challenge in
the CDF case, arguing inter alia that
the Prosecutor did not plead the “alleged
criminal purpose of the JCE” with sufficient specificity. However, despite the
similar descriptions of the underlying
“plan, purpose or design” in the two cases,
Trial Chamber I, without directly responding to Fofana’s challenge regarding the
“alleged criminal purpose of the JCE,”
refused to dismiss the JCE charges in
the CDF case. Nevertheless, in analyzing the alleged criminal responsibility of
Fofana and Kondewa for any given act, the
Chamber repeatedly found that “[a]lthough
on the basis of the evidence adduced it
appears that Norman, Fofana, Kondewa
and their subordinates may have acted in
concert with each other, we find that there
is no evidence upon which to conclude
beyond reasonable doubt that they did so
in order to further a common purpose, plan
or design to commit criminal acts.” Thus,
neither Fofana nor Kondewa were convicted for any crime on the basis of a JCE
theory of liability.
With respect to the four counts of war
crimes for which the Accused were convicted, the Chamber found that between
November 1997 and December 1999,
Fofana and Kondewa were responsible, at
times directly and at times through their
roles as superiors, for acts of murder,
cruel treatment, pillage, and issuing collective punishments in violation of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II. These acts included
the killing of captured enemy combatants
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and “collaborators,” infliction of suffering
or injury upon them, and destruction of
their houses. The Trial Chamber acquitted
both Fofana and Kondewa of aiding and
abetting the war crime of terrorism based
on a finding that it had not been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the primary perpetrator, Norman, acted with the
specific intent to spread terror, and that
therefore it had not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Fofana and Kondewa
had the requisite knowledge to be convicted of aiding and abetting terrorism as
a war crime.
The Trial Chamber also unanimously
acquitted both Fofana and Kondewa of
the charges of murder and other inhumane
acts as crimes against humanity because,
despite establishing that the alleged acts
formed part of a widespread attack, the
Prosecutor failed to prove that “the civilian population was the primary object of
the attack.” In reaching this conclusion,
the Court noted the Prosecutor’s admission
that the CDF had “fought for the restoration of democracy.”
Finally, Trial Chamber I convicted
Kondewa of committing other serious violations of international humanitarian law
through his conscription and use of child
soldiers under the age of 15. Fofana was
acquitted under this charge, based on a
finding of insufficient evidence, despite
factual findings by the Court that Fofana
had been in the presence of child soldiers
at the headquarters for the CDF High
Command and had attended a meeting at
which Norman had stated that the “adult
fighters were doing less than the children.”
By contrast, the Chamber found that, as
the CDF’s High Priest, Kondewa was in
charge of initiating new members into
the CDF, which included children under
the age of 15. These children did not
merely partake in a “societal initiation,”
the Chamber held, but were given a potion
to rub on their bodies for strength, put into
military training and forced to participate
in battle. Kondewa also used children at
checkpoints and as bodyguards, supplying
them with knives and guns. The Chamber
found that Kondewa was aware that many
of the CDF’s soldiers were younger than
15, noting that children as young as seven
danced before him prior to battle.

A sentencing hearing was held several
weeks after the conviction of Fofana and
Kondewa, and on October 9, 2007, the
Trial Chamber issued its sentencing judgment. Although the Chamber handed down
separate sentences, ranging from three to
eight years, for each guilty count entered
against Fofana and Kondewa, respectively,
it ordered that the sentences be served
concurrently. Thus, Fofana will serve a
total of six years, and Kondewa a total
of eight years, with credit for time served
since taken into custody on May 29, 2003.
These sentences stand in sharp contrast
to those handed down to each of the convicted members of the AFRC group in July
2007, which range from 45 to 50 years’
imprisonment. The Trial Chamber in the
CDF case explained the relatively lenient
sentences given to Fofana and Kondewa by
stating that harsh sentences would be counterproductive to deterrence and the Court’s
overall objectives of justice, peace and
reconciliation. In determining the appropriate sentences, the Chamber took into
account the motivation of each accused to
reinstate democracy and the surrounding
circumstances of the war. It acknowledged
the “justice or propriety” of pro-democracy
armed forces, but also stated that the laws
of war must be observed even when a
group is defending legitimate causes.

International Criminal Court
Prosecution of Sexual Violence
in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
The International Criminal Court (ICC)
has received much criticism due to the
narrow focus of its efforts to bring justice and accountability to the situation in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). Specifically, until the fall of 2007,
the Prosecutor’s investigations into widespread violations in the DRC resulted in
the issuance of an arrest warrant for only
one individual, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, for
the conscription of child soldiers during his
role as leader of the Union of Congolese
Patriots. The arrest warrant failed to adequately address the broad range of violations attributable to parties to the conflict
in the Ituri region of Eastern DRC.
ICC critics were partially mollified by
the arrest and transfer of a second accused,
General Germain Katanga, chief of staff of
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the Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri, to
the ICC’s detention center at Scheveningen
in October 2007. Katanga’s arrest warrant notes that there is reason to believe
he is responsible for a number of crimes
falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The
case against Katanga seems, therefore,
to more accurately reflect the full scope
and gravity of violations reported than
did charges against Lubanga. Although
reports indicate that crimes of a sexual
nature have been rampant in the DRC, the
Prosecution did not include them among
the charges against Lubanga for reasons
that may be related to the availability of
evidence. The decision not to include the
charges may have also been based on
Moreno-Ocampo’s Prosecutorial Strategy
of focused investigations and prosecutions,
in which a limited number of incidents and
witnesses are selected to permit expeditious trials. The broader charges against
Katanga may signify a shift away from
the strategic focus on a limited sample of
incidents and types of criminality. Katanga
is charged with the sexual enslavement of
women and girls both as a crime against
humanity and as a war crime.
The prosecution of sexual violence
in armed conflict is critical due to the
alarming rate at which militant groups are
employing sexual violence as a strategy for
attaining military objectives. Authorities
agree that the scale and brutality of sexual
violence in the DRC indicates the existence
of coordinated strategies whereby militant
groups seek to gain military advantage
by terrorizing, weakening, and destroying civilian communities through sexual
violence. International law emphatically
prohibits such conduct, as evidenced in
both custom and treaties.
Sexual violence during armed conflict
has been prohibited since as early as the
fifteenth century when 27 judges of the
Holy Roman Empire convicted Peter van
Hagenbach, a knight acting under the command of the Duke of Burgundy, because
he allowed his troops to rape and kill civilians during the siege of a German town.
Eminent publicist Hugo Grotius reaffirmed
this prohibition in the mid-seventeenth
century, and this prohibition is reflected
in many domestic manuals, including the
influential 1863 U.S. Lieber Code that
governed American Civil War soldiers’
conduct. By the middle of the twentieth
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century, many national courts had confirmed that rape constitutes not only a
violation of the laws and customs of war,
but also gives rise to individual criminal
responsibility. Authorities including the
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
Rome Statute of the ICC have noted that
the act of rape constitutes the willful infliction of “great suffering” amounting to a
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.
Finally, sexual violence is prohibited under
the Rome Statute. Katanga, for example,
is charged specifically with the sexual
enslavement of women and girls, punishable both as a crime against humanity
under Art. 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute, and
as a war crime under Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii).
Despite the deep-rooted prohibition on
sexual violence in armed conflict, the
practice continues to constitute a disturbingly common tactic employed by warring
factions in the central African conflicts
that have given rise to ICC investigations
and arrest warrants. This is evidenced
in part by the outstanding arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti
of the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s
Resistance Army, and Ahmed Harun and
Ali Kosheyb of Sudan — all charged with
crimes of sexual violence. In the DRC,
organizations serving victims of sexual
violence estimate that 14,000 rapes have
occurred in North Kivu since 2004, and
around 1,400 in the past six months alone.
Katanga’s trial represents the ICC’s first
opportunity to bring its own formulation
of this centuries-old prohibition to bear on
the continuing and unlawful use of sexual
violence in armed conflict.

Next Steps and New
Investigations in the
Darfur Situation
Further steps the Office of the Prosecutor
took last fall that sought to improve the
ICC’s effectiveness involved increasing
pressure on Sudan to cooperate with the
outstanding arrest warrants, and promising
to open up new investigations in the Darfur
Situation. On December 6, 2007, in the
Prosecutor’s sixth address to the Security
Council on Darfur, he stressed that Sudan
“is not fulfilling its duty to protect its
citizens, and is allowing members of the
government to attack them.” Highlighting

what many see as Sudan’s flagrant disregard for United Nations (UN) efforts to
intervene through diplomacy and the ICC,
the Prosecutor deplored Sudan’s failure to
protect its citizens and failure to cooperate
with the ICC in continuing “in full sight of
the international community.”
The Prosecutor called on the Security
Council to send a strong and unanimous
message to the Sudanese government to
comply with Resolution 1593 and execute
arrest warrants for Ahmed Haroun, Minister
of State for Humanitarian Affairs, and
Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed militia leader,
who the Sudanese government recently
released from prison despite the ICC arrest
warrant. Most Security Council members,
other attending UN Member States, and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
responded by urging support for the ICC,
but the statement was soon abandoned due
to Chinese and Russian opposition. While
this was a disappointing show of political
will, human rights groups have noted that
the statement would not have added to
Sudan’s existing obligation under Security
Council Resolution 1593 to comply with
the ICC’s arrest warrants with respect to
the Darfur crisis.
The Prosecutor also announced plans
to investigate two new cases. The first
involves ongoing attacks on Sudan’s internally displaced persons living in temporary camps. He emphasized that the evidence indicates “[a] calculated, organized
campaign by Sudanese officials to attack
individuals and further destroy the social
fabric of the society.” The evidence, he
says, “points not to chaotic and isolated
acts, but to a pattern of attacks.” Notably,
the Prosecutor attributes the attacks to the
Sudanese government. He has indicated
that he will trace responsibility up the
chain of command and seek to identify
“[those] bearing the greatest responsibility for ongoing attacks against civilians;
[those] … maintaining Haroun in a position to commit crimes, [and those] …
instructing.”
Such an investigation, if pursued,
would represent an aggressive approach to
stemming the flow of tolerance that characterizes political and military command
structures that allow or condone grave
violations of the rules of armed conflict
protecting civilians. As many critics note,
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while it is important to try military commanders for improper conduct, impunity
must end for political leaders that plan and
sponsor armed hostilities in violation of
international law.
The Prosecutor’s second new investigation involves attacks on humanitarian
workers and peacekeepers. In particular,
the Prosecutor plans to investigate an attack
on African Union peacekeepers in Darfur
that left ten dead and eight wounded last
fall. For aid groups and peacekeepers to
function properly in armed conflict, international law prohibits armed groups from
subjecting them to military attack. Where
mass atrocities have caused the deaths of
250,000 people and displaced 2.5 million,
the importance of such an investigation
rests in large part on its power to deter
future attacks. This is critical to allowing
humanitarian workers to function during
armed conflict and to stymie the escalation
of civilian damages. Otherwise, humanitarian workers are largely limited to repairing
avoidable damages after hostilities cease.

The Assembly of States Parties
The ICC’s governing body, the
Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to the
Rome Statute, concluded its sixth meeting
in December 2007 at UN Headquarters in
New York. The ASP elected three new
judges to replace judges who resigned
before the end of their nine-year terms.
Fumiko Saiga of Japan will finish Judge
Claude Jorda’s term and is eligible for reelection for an additional nine-year term.
Bruno Cotte of France will serve the
remainder of Judge Maureen Clark’s term,
and Daniel David Nsereko of Uganda will
replace Judge Karl Hudson-Phillips. The
ASP enhanced the Trust Fund for Victims
to allow greater flexibility for earmarking
donations and adopted a recommendation
of the Committee on Budget and Finance
not to provide increased resources for legal
aid in the Office of Public Counsel for the
Defense.
The Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression continued discussing definitions of aggression; the ASP
appointed a Focal Point on cooperation,
emphasized as a result of Sudan’s defiance
of ICC arrest warrants; the ASP increased
assistance to ICC outreach activities; and
the Prosecutor announced new investiga-
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tions on three continents — one of which is
thought to be Latin America, where a delegation has met with victims and officials
in Colombia. Finally, the ASP welcomed
Japan and Chad as new States Parties,
bringing the total number of ratifications
of the Rome Statute to 105.

Hybrid and Internationalized
Tribunals
The Special Tribunal
For Lebanon
The United Nations (UN) recently took
important steps to create a Special Tribunal
for Lebanon to try those accused of the 2005
assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri. A divided Lebanese
Government failed to agree on a tribunal.
As a result, in early May 2007 current
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora
sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon requesting the UN establish the
tribunal as a matter of urgency. On May
30, the UN Security Council adopted a
resolution formally endorsing the tribunal’s creation; ten Council members voted
for the resolution and five abstained.

persons would not serve sentences in the
Netherlands. Moreover, the Netherlands
requires the UN and its member states to
finance the tribunal, not the Dutch government. Mr. Ban estimates the tribunal
will cost $120 million over three years.
UN member states have already donated
$30 million. Once the Dutch Parliament
ratifies the agreement it will be officially
finalized.
In a January press conference, Mr.
Ban announced the tribunal’s creation and
affirmed that the UN and the Lebanese
government were making “good progress”
coordinating efforts. Nevertheless, he was
concerned that Lebanese legislators failed
to resolve the deadlock over the election
of a new Lebanese president. Internal
governmental strife will make it difficult
for Lebanon to fully assist the UN in its
investigation. Mr. Ban noted that he would
announce the names of the tribunal’s judges
once preparations were complete.

The War Crimes Chamber of
the Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina

The tribunal’s mandate is to try individuals suspected of assassinating Hariri,
killed on February 14, 2005, when explosives were set off as his motorcade drove
through Beirut. The tribunal has the
authority to try those responsible for other
assassinated Lebanese political leaders.
A minority of Lebanese judges and a
majority of foreign judges will sit in each
chamber of the international hybrid tribunal. According to UN Security Council
Resolution 1664 (2006), the tribunal will
be “of an international character based
on the highest international standards of
criminal justice.” Although international
in nature, the Special Tribunal will implement Lebanese law. The harshest penalty
the tribunal can administer is life imprisonment.

On October 4, 2007, the Appeals
Chamber of the War Crimes Chamber of
the State Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina
(WCC) confirmed its conviction of former
Serb military member Radisav Ljubinac,
for persecuting Bosniak civilians in the
Rogatica Municipality while acting in his
official capacity. Ljubinac was convicted,
on the basis of aiding and abetting, of
three counts of crimes against humanity
as persecution: 1) participating in forcible
relocation of Bosniak civilians; 2) committing inhumane acts of violence against
detained civilians in the Rasadnik camp,
with the intent of inflicting great suffering;
and 3) transferring 27 civilians to the village of Duljevac, where Serb forces used
them as human shields and later executed
them. Ljubinac received a sentence of ten
years imprisonment for his crimes.

In late December 2007, the UN
reached an important agreement with the
Dutch government to house the tribunal in Leidschendam, a city bordering
The Hague. The tribunal will be located
in a building that until recently housed
the Dutch AIVD intelligence service. The
Netherlands stipulated that as a condition for hosting the tribunal, convicted

The Prosecution had to establish that
Ljubinac committed criminal offenses outlined in Article 172 of the Criminal Code
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (CC BiH) and that
the chapeau elements of crimes against
humanity were present. The chapeau elements require that there be a widespread
or systematic attack; that the attack be
directed against any civilian population;
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that the Accused know of such an attack;
that his acts be part of the attack and
that the accused know that his acts were
part of the attack. To prove the crimes
were committed as acts of persecution, the
Prosecution had to establish that Ljubinac
acted with discriminatory intent against
the victims because they were part of a
political, racial, ethnic, religious, national,
cultural, gender or otherwise identifiable
group, and that discriminatory acts resulted
in the deprivation of a fundamental human
right.
The Prosecution sought to prove a
widespread or systematic attack took place
against Bosniak civilians in Rogatica by
establishing judicial notice of that fact,
as proven by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
in Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik. Article
4 of the Law on the Transfer of Cases
(which governs Rule 11 bis transfers of
accused from the ICTY to the WCC)
allows the Court “to accept as proven those
facts that are established by legally binding
decisions in any other proceedings by the
ICTY … .” The Prosecution must move to
have the requested facts established as evidence, and the defense is given an opportunity to rebut alleged facts. Establishing
judicial notice of facts proven by the ICTY
has been an important tool for making the
trials more efficient.
Another key issue raised in most WCC
trials is the question of which law to apply.
The Defense, employing a principle of
legality argument, claimed the Criminal
Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (CC SFRY) should be utilized,
since that criminal code was in force at the
time the crimes were committed. Under the
CC SFRY, the category of crimes against
humanity did not exist. The Trial Chamber
held that the CC BiH applies, adopted in
2003 to govern all WCC trials.
Although crimes against humanity were
not codified in the CC SFRY, such crimes
were established as a part of customary
international law when the accused committed them. As such, the court concluded,
the principle of legality is kept intact
through the application of the CC BiH.
Moreover, the acts were codified as specific crimes under the CC SFRY. Under
Article 4 of the CC BiH, if a law has been
amended after the perpetration of a crime,
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the law that envisages the more lenient
punishment should be applied. The court
stayed true to this principle as well. Under
the CC SFRY, the applicable punishment
was the death penalty, but under the CC
BiH, Ljubinac received the more lenient
punishment of ten years’ imprisonment.
Strong evidence from victims or firsthand witnesses exists proving Ljubinac’s
role in aiding and abetting in the crimes of
persecution of forcible transfer of Bosniak
men, women, and children, the severe beatings of civilian detainees, and the transfer
of a group of 27 civilians to Duljevac where
they were used as human shields and later
executed. The Court identified two main
aggravating factors; first, it considered
forcible transfer an especially grave crime,
as it enabled the greater plan of ethnic
cleansing. Second, aiding in the severe
beating of helpless civilians and their use
as human shields exemplified a high level
of cruelty, and commission of those crimes
as persecution further aggravated the circumstances. Ljubinac was acquitted of
three counts of crimes against humanity,
including other acts of persecution and
murder, due to a lack of evidence.
On appeal, the Defense again raised
the applicability of the CC BiH. Using
the same rationale as the Trial Chamber,
the Appellate Chamber confirmed that
the CC BiH was correctly applied. The
Prosecution argued there was sufficient
evidence to convict Ljubinac on the three
acquitted charges, but the Appellate
Chamber confirmed the Trial Chamber’s
ruling that a lack of evidence existed proving the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The Prosecution then argued for a
longer sentence. The Trial Chamber had
viewed Ljubinac’s alcoholism as a mitigating factor in the sentencing, reasoning that
the accused’s desire to become a valued
member of an organization (the Serb military) should be viewed as a consequence of
his disease and the resulting social stigma,
and therefore not entirely in his control.
The Appellate Chamber disagreed, saying,
“[T]he Prosecutor is right when stating
that excessive drinking before the war
cannot be taken as a mitigating circumstance on the part of the Accused when
meting out the punishment.” Nonetheless,
the Appellate Chamber considered the ten-

year sentence to be appropriate considering
that the accused did not have a high level
of intent and was not the organizer of the
entire criminal activity in question.

The Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia
On Christmas Day 2007, protestors
in Cambodia marched in Phnom Penh to
demonstrate their desire for a speedier resolution to the trials of five former Khmer
Rouge leaders. The protestors’ displeasure
with the current process is illustrative of
various problems the ECCC faces, most
recently with funding. Although the tribunal is budgeted $56.3 million, a heavy
workload means it will operate through
2010, as opposed to the original 2009
deadline. Peter Foster, a UN-appointed
spokesman for the tribunal, predicts the
current funds may only last another six
months because of unexpected costs. For
example, the tribunal currently employs
only 14 translators but needs at least 40 to
translate the 300,000 pages of Cambodianlanguage documents into English.
Donor support was shaken after two
UN reports in 2007 raised doubts about the
tribunal’s administration. Specifically, a
UN audit last spring found that Cambodian
staff were often under-qualified and
that the tribunal paid inflated salaries to
Cambodians. Despite such problems, the
UN is planning a major fund-raising drive
that may bring the budget to over $120 million. Even the United States, which made
no contributions to the original budget, is
considering a donation. Joseph Mussomeli,
U.S. ambassador to Cambodia, made evident the United States’ reticence to give,
stating in a December 26, 2007 article from
the Associated Press, “It would simply be
irresponsible to suggest using American
taxpayer money until we’re sure that the
administrative process is also fixed.” Such
doubts notwithstanding, it is ultimately a
positive sign that the United States is considering a donation at all.
Despite the tribunal’s problems, it has
also made important progress in recent
months. The ECCC held its first public
session on November 20, 2007, a pre-trial
hearing for Kaing Guek Eav, also known
as Duch. He is charged with crimes against
humanity for his activities as head of the
infamous S-21 prison at Tuol Sleng, where
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regime officials tortured and killed thousands of Cambodians. Duch requested bail
ahead of his trial, scheduled to begin this
year. Journalists, international observers
and Cambodian citizens alike packed the
tribunal’s compound.
Duch argued he should be released on
bail because he had already been detained
for over eight years without a trial. The
66-year-old has been detained since 1999
for charges the Cambodian government
brought against him, and was transferred to
the ECCC’s custody in late July 2007. On
December 3, 2007, the five-judge panel,
composed of three Cambodian judges and
two UN-appointed international judges,
unanimously ruled that Duch should
remain in detention, concluding that if
Duch were allowed to go free, his life
could be in danger, he could try to flee the
country, and he could constitute a threat to
other witnesses.
The ECCC has also been bolstered by
the recent detention of three senior Khmer
Rouge leaders. Before November 2007,
Duch and Nuon Chea, known as “Brother
Number Two” due to his service as Pol
Pot’s second in command, were the tribunal’s only detainees. On November 12,
2007, Ieng Sary, who served as foreign
minister for the Khmer Rouge regime,
and his wife Ieng Thirith, who served as
minister for social affairs, were arrested
at their home in Phnom Penh. The next
day Sary was charged with war crimes and
crimes against humanity, while Thirith was
charged solely with crimes against humanity. Sary allegedly perpetrated murders
and assisted in policies of forcible transfer
and forced labor. Thirith is suspected of
orchestrating purges and the murders of
various members of the Ministry of Social
Affairs.
A week later, former Khmer Rouge head
of state Khieu Samphan was arrested at a
hospital in Phnom Penh. The 76-year-old
had been flown to a hospital in Cambodia’s
capital the week before after suffering
a stroke. Samphan became president of
Democratic Kampuchea (as Cambodia was
referred to at the time) when the Khmer
Rouge ascended to power. He has consistently argued that his role as president was
merely ceremonial. Moreover, in his recent
book Reflection on Cambodian History
up to the Era of Democratic Kampuchea,
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Samphan referred to Pol Pot as a patriot
and claimed that in the Khmer Rouge government “[t]here was no policy of starving
people. Nor was there any direction set out
for carrying out mass killings.” Samphan
was charged with crimes against humanity
and war crimes for his role in the Khmer
Rouge regime.
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rights of citizens. Described as a persuasive politician, Pitsuwan received his
Ph.D. in political science and Middle
Eastern studies from Harvard University
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Nakhon Si Thammarat, Thailand, where
he served nine terms and was appointed
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been under house arrest since her National
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on Human Security of the United Nations
and served as an advisor to the International
Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, which produced the wellknown Responsibility to Protect report.
He also served on the International Labor
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Social Dimension of Globalization.
Whether the new ASEAN charter
remains just an academic assertion of lofty
goals or an institution of fundamental human
rights depends largely on the decisions
made in the next five years. Commissioners
from the national human rights organizations of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
and the Philippines met on January 29 to
establish a framework for the proposed
regional body, the ASEAN Human Rights
Commission. During the two-day meeting,
the commissioners proposed that members
of the Commission be appointed by their
respective foreign ministries from a list of
candidates drawn by a selection committee consisting of national institutions and
civil society. The proposal will go back
to the four existing national commissions
and individual national governments for
further discussion before being submitted
to ASEAN as a whole.
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